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ANTITRUST, JOINT VENTURES AND THE END OF
THE AMA's CONTRACT PRACTICE ETHICS: NEW
WAYS OF THINKING ABOUT THE HEALTH
CARE INDUSTRY
CHARLES

D.

WELLER*

On June 18, 1982 the Supreme Court of the United States in ,4ri:zma
r. Maricopa Count), Medical Society' ruled that neither "the fact that
doctors rather than nonprofessionals" were involved, nor the judiciary's "little antitrust experience in the health care industry," nor the
view that "the health care industry was so far removed from the competitive model" justified special treatment for the health care field. The
Maricopa decision poignantly symbolizes the end of an era for the nation's $400 billion health care industry. As a recent American Medical
Association (AMA) National Leadership Conference accurately
pointed out, there are "changing economic realities-It [is] not business
as usual." 2 The era when antitrust was unknown to health care, and
when health insurance was built upon the AMA's contract practice and
3
"free choice" ethics apparently is over.
Antitrust and the private market principles that the antitrust laws
embody constitute an entirely new way of zhinking about the health
care industry. One of the most illuminating branches of this new way
of thinking about the health care industry, with its fragmented structure consisting of many independent firms, is the antitrust law of joint
ventures.
This article begins by examining how perverse incentives caused by
non-price competition among doctors aad hospitals fuel high inflation
in health care; how price competition can be injected into provider
markets for private sector solutions to work; and how the present structure of American health insurance was built upon the AMA's illegal
contract practice and "free choice" ethics. The article then reviews fundamental principles of antitrust and joint venture law and applies them
to ten examples taken from the health care field.
*

Of Counsel. Jones. Day. Reavis & Pogue. Cleveland, Ohio.
I. 102 S. Ct. 2466 (1982).
2. Economic Realities Altering Profesion. Medical Leaders Told. Am. Med. News. March 4.
1983.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 78-91.
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I.

A.

COMPETITION AND THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY 4

The Principal Cause of High Health Care Costs. The Per terse
Incentives of Non-Price Competition Among Doctors and
Hospitals

Perverse incentives are the principal cause of high health care costs.
Under the predominant forms of public and private health insurance.
there is virtually no price competition between doctors and other providers of health care services. Consequently, there are little or no incentives for doctors and hospitals to perform efficiently: "Probably the
principal factor contributing to inflation has been the predominant system of third party reimbursement based on what institutions spend and
what physicians charge."' In the system of "usual and customary" reimbursement to physicians and "cost" reimbursement to hospitals that
currently dominates health care financing, the question of the efficient
use of resources does not arise. This system actually rewards cost-increasing behavior with more revenue and ppnishes cost-reducing behavior with less revenue. Such an incentive system perversely and
persistently inflates prices and wastes resources.
Physicians order services that directly or indirectly account for approximately seventy percent of total health care costs." Even though
physician orders generate these costs, the physicians have no financial
responsibility for them. Physicians have no incentive to seek out
equally effective but less costly alternatives. A, a result, **most physicians do not have the vaguest notion of what things they order cost." 7
The same disincentives for efficiency and incentives for waste operate on hospitals. The hospital that screens out unnecessary admissions
and discharges patients as soon as medically appropriate loses revenue.
Consumers similarly are largely indifferent to costs. Since insurance
pays most bills for the vast majority of patients. the consumer has no
4 The pilicy analysis presented here. applying market prtnciples to the health care field. is
taken from the writings of others, particularly the writings of Walter McClure. See generals
McClure. 7he .liedical Care Si)siem Under ,atonal /lealih Insuranee.- vuf .fodels. I J. llLAI
It!
l'oL. P)LY & LA%522 (1976): Enthoven. Ilealih Core Coszs" If"hr Regularton Fadis. Hoi"
(Comperton i'-,rksr. H/ow to Get There From ilere. II NAT'L J. 885 (1979): Ellwood. .Vodel.r/r
Oriani:ing Health Serices and Implication.r

of Legislatire Proposals Ipt. 2). 50 MILBA.sK

.Mi .l)l.,,L F,.t) Q. 73 (1972): A. ENTIIOVE.'.

HELALTHt PLA. 70-113 (1Q80): C. )Av(,Itt'1ST.
(1982): lavighurst. Ilealh Maintenane
Oran,:atonsand the Market for 1/calth Services. 35 LAW & CONTI.mP. PROD. 716 (1970): W
McClure. Comprehenstve Market and Regulatory Strategies for Medical Care 11980) (published
InterStudy paper).
5 IIEW. FORWARD PLAN FOR IEALYtI: FISCAL YF.ARS 1980-1982. at 34(1976). Seealso S.
Ri.p No 1285. 93t). CO.%(;.. 2o SEss.. reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CON(;. & AD. NEws.seesupra
note 4
6 Egdahl. Fee For Seriice ilealth Maintenance Organi:at'ons. 241 J.A.M.A 588 (1979).
7 Am. Med. News. June 22. 1979. at 9. col. 2 (quoting Dr. Darrell Cannon).
DiR1(,L'LATIN(;

TilL
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https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol14/iss1/4

CARE

INDUSTRY

2

Weller: Antitrust, Joint Ventures and the End of the AMA's Contract Pract

.4NTITRUST IN HEALTH CARE
incentive to seek out equally effective but less costly doctors and
hospitals.
Perverse incentives result in rewards to inefficient providers at the
expense of the efficient. Since extravagent care is rewarded with more
reimbursement, a "spare no expense" mentality develops and drives
health care costs unnecessarily high." Unless this system of perverse
incentives is changed. the health care industry will continue to experience unacceptably high inflation.
There are basically two ways to address the problem of perverse incentives: government regulation and market reform. Government regulation attempts to use public economic controls as a substitute for
missing market incentives for efficiency.' Health planning agencies
and hospital rate-setting commissions exemplify the regulatory
approach.
Market reform is a new approach to reducing health care costs. Recently there has been a tremendous increase in the interest in and
number of proposals for using "competition" as a therapy for the
health care field's high rates of inflation.' ° The essential requirement
for market reform, however, is the introduction of price competition
among health care providers.
B.

The Competitive Alternatives. Provider Price Competition Over
Fees and Premiums

As the Supreme Court stated long ago, price is the "central nervous
system of the economy."" Price competition amongproviders is central
to a market solution to the health care cost problem. "There is one
awesome condition that hospitals and physicians must meet if the market is to work: . . . doctors and hospitals have
to compete with each
2
other for consumers on the basis of price."'
Presently, considerable non-price competition exists in provider markets. What is missing is provider competition over price:
8. See. e.g.. V. FUctIS. WHO SIIALL LIVE? 92-95 (1974); Enthoven. Cutting Costs Without
Cutting the Quah of Care, 298 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1229. 1234-35 (1978) (curtailing "flat of the
curve" medicine): McNerney. ;hv Does ,fedical Care Cost So Much?. 282 NEw Em;. J. MEz.
1458 (1970).

9. Seegeneralir P. AatEEDA & D. TURNER. I ANTITRUST LAw 221-27 (1978) (competitio.I in

regulated industries).

10. See Competition in Ileath Care: Would/i Bring Costs Down?. CONG. Q. WEEKLY Rc.p..
Aug. 4. 1979. at 1587 and STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS. SUBCOMM. ON
7

HF.ALTII. 9 THt CONG.. IST SEss.. DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSALS TO STIMULATE COMPETITION IN

TIHE FINANCING AND DELIVERY OF HEALTH CARE (Comm. Print 1981) for a discussion of the
legislative proposals. and Weller. The Primary ofStandordAntilrutAnalysisin Health Care. 14 U.
TOL. L.- REV. 609 (1983) for a discussion of antitrust enforcement.
II. United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co.. 310 U.S. 150. 224 n.59 (1940).
12 byEllwood.
The Scholarship
importance Digital
of the Market.
HEALTH POL.. POLY & LAW 447. 448 (1978).
Published
History and
Archives,2J.
1983
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[TJhe truth is that hospitals have always competed with each other in
multihospital settings. The competition has been for physicians, reputation, patients, and other prizes as opposed to reduced costs, but it has
been occurring for a long time. What the new market forces are provoking is a different set of competitive goals for hospitals: efficiency.
appropriate utilization, cost effectiveness, and innovative patterns of
care. I
Health care providers can compete over price in two basic ways:
competition with respect to fees, and competition with respect to premiums. Provider price competition overfees may exist when consumers
have to pay some of the bill when they receive health care services.
The consumer who has to pay a portion of the bill will be sensitive to
price in non-emergency situations.'
Provider competition over premiumns may exist when consumers
choose between competing groups of providers who offer their services
for a premium. However, present competition over premiums is between insurers, not doctors and hospitals. Specifically, provider price
competition over premiums requires, first, health care plans. that is.
distinct groups of providers who offer their services for a premium, and
second, consumer choice of health care plans and other forms of health
insurance on a price incentive basis.' 5 That is, consumers must be able
to choose between providers, between the different health care plans
with their limited group of providers, and other forms of insurance
based on the relative efficiency of the providers involved. For example.
an employer could use a cafeteria-style offering of fringe benefits, or
the employee could pay a portion of the premium should he or she
select an insurer that costs more than the employer's fixed contribution.
C. Health Care Plans
Health care plans are limited groups of health care providers who
provide health care to consumers for a premium. Health care plans
may be sponsored by physicians, insurers, labor unions, employers, or
others. Health care plans can take several forms.' For example, statf
model Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) provide services at
13.

Friedman. Does Market Competition Belong in lealth Care?. 54 IIosPITALS 47. 49 (19hoI.

See also Williams. How to Meet the New Demands in Ambulatory Care. THtUSTLE. Dec. 1980. at
47.

14. Proposals for major-risk insurance use. coinsurance, and deductibles to increase COnsumer price sensitivity. See. e.g.. Feldstein. A New Approach to Nationalhealth Insurance. 23
PUBLIC INTEREST 93 (1971); McClure.supra note 4. at 44-47. See also C. PII'LPS. lEALTII CARI"
CosTs: THE CONSEQUENCES OF INCREASED COST SHARING (1982).
15. P. Ellwood & W. McClure. Health Delivery Reform 2 (Nov. 17. 1976) (unpublshed InterStudy paper). See supra note 4. See also infra part III.B.
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a central facility and employ providers." Staff model HMOs are usually health care plans, because it would be financially impossible to
emplo) large groups of providers. Another type of HMO--the Independent Practice Association (1PA)-provides services at the offices
of its member-physicians and reimburses the physicians in various
ways.' 7 IPAs traditionally have been open to all interested area physicians and, therefore, are not health care plans because they do not involve a limited group of providers.' 8 Only IPAs that have limited
groups of providers qualify as "health care plans." Similarly. HMOs of
all kinds may, or may not, be "health care plans."
Health care plans create price competition among providers. Obviously, an efficient group of providers affiliated with a health care plan
could offer services for a lower premium than an inefficient group. If
the number of physicians or other providers is not limited, however,

price competition and its private incentives for provider efficiency are
lost.

In summary, market reforms in health care must be designed to eliminate existing perverse incentives, and to do this must introduce price
competition among health care providers over fees or premiums.
Guild Opposition to Price Competition Among Providers: The
AM,4 's Contract Practice Ethics

D.

In a guild model of the economy, price competition is a restraint of
trade. The health professions have a deeply rooted commitment to a
guild model of the economy. As an American Medical Association
publication stated the AMA has "clung to many features of the guild
form of organization and the ethics based on these relations.""
For more than fifty years, the AMA and its affiliated societies took
the position that price competition by physicians was "unethical."
16

U.S. Dhri

OR;ANIZATIONS

IIEALTII &

IUMAN SERVICE.S. INVESTOR'S GUIDE TO HEALTHI MAINTENANCE

14 (1982).

17 Id at 15.
18 IPA's traditionally are organized by local medical societies who follow the now illegal
contract practice ethics and guild 'free choice" ethics. See infra text accompanying notes 20-46.
19. AmI-.RICA MEDICAL Asso 'IATION. ECONOMICS AND THE ETHICS OF MEDICINE 8 (1936).
Se also AMI-RICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION. AN INTRODUCTION TO MEDICAL ECONOMICS 18-19
(1933).
While the relations of employer and employee, of landlord, merchant and capitalist were
completely transformed by the coming of the machine and the factory, the relations of patient
and physician remained almost unaltered from the dawn of history. through all the changes
from domestic to household and factory industry. . . lilt is a rule with few exceptions that
whenever an attempt has been made to transplant the ethics, theories or forms of organization
of business into the fields of art. science, law. education or medicine the result has been
harmful to professional standards and progress.
Id.
Little has changed in fifty years.

Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1983
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Under the AMA's long established contract practice and "free choice"
ethics, physicians were prohibited from providing medical services in
contracts that paid less than "usual fees," involved "underbidding." or
were not open to all interested physicians (AMA "free choice").
By rejecting price competition among physicians, the medical professional for over fifty years has operated at odds with the nature of the
free market system. Guild economics rejects private market principles.
Contractual arrangements with health care plans and insurers that create price competition among physicians are opposed as "unethical" and
"unfair competition." Instead, contractual arrangements that eliminate
physician price competition are viewed as "fair competition" and
"ethical."
TiE END OF THE AMA's CONTRACT PRAL'ritti E ritics
A. American Medical Association v. Federal Trade Commission
In Amnerican Medical Association r. Federal Trade Cn.,niivson II the
United States Supreme Court affirmed two opinions where .standard
antitrust analysis was used in ruling that the AMA's ethical restrictions
on physician advertising, solicitation, and contract practice were illegal. The two opinions, one written by an administrative law judge
and one by the Commission, together run over three hundred pages
and contain the most extensive examples of standard antitrust and rule
of' reason analysis yet applied to the health care field. They are an
invaluable resource that to date has largely been untapped by the
courts and commentators alike.
Regarding the AMA's advertising and solicitation ethics, the trial
judge's exhaustive opinion cited numerous examples of ethical restrictions on the dissemination of information concerning the price, type.
and availability of medical services. 22 The advertising and solicitation
ethics were restrictively applied to innovative clinics and preventive
medicine programs; 2 ' HMOs and other prepaid group practice plans:-4
announcements, from letters and brochures; ' newspaper advertising:-"
radio and television advertising:" publicity in the news media:2' Yel-

11.

20, 94 F.T.C. 701 (1979) . modied and enforced. 638 F.2d 443 (2d ('If 1980). a://J1meat.b%
an equally divided court. 102 S. CT. 1744 (1982). The Commi.noion' opinon I J.,i rceported at
1980-1 TRAE. CAS. (CCIt) 63.164 (1979).
u' )
21. The trial judge's antirust analysis may be found at 94 I'.T C at S1I-911. 430-h (1 Q
and the Commission's at 94 F.T.C. at 996-1017 (1979).
22. 94 F.T.C. at 808-96. 936-56. The Commission's anailsis asat 94 F.T C at 1,-*-I I
23. Id. at 820.
24. Id at 828.
25. Id at 836.
26 Id at 841.
27. Id. at 846.
28. Id at 848.
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low Page listings; direct contact with institutions and physicians;'"
various other incidents involving direct contacts with potential users of"
medical services1 open houses: and other methods of soliciting patients.33 The Commission concluded. "The evidence confirms that the
restrictions have been applied as an absolute ban governing situations
in which the dangers contemplated by respondant are imperceptible if
they exist at all," 3' and held the AMA's advertising and solicitation
ethics unlawful restraints of trade.
The most important part of the case, however, involved the AMA's
contract practice and "free choice" ethics. Unfortunately, this portion
of the case has generally been ignored. As their name suggests, the
contract practice ethics govern every contractual arrangement a physician can enter to provide medical services. The AMA defined contract
practice in the following broad terms: "It is unprofessional for a physician to dispose of his services under conditions that make it impossible
to render adequate service to his patient or which interfere with reasonable competition among the physicians of a community.""
In practice. the AMA's interpretation of this broad language made it
unethical for a physician to enter any contract that generated competition among doctors over price and efliciency. Specifically. the fbllowing contractural arrangements were considered "unethical" and
"unfair":
(1) When the compensation received is inadequate based on the usual
fees paid for the same kind of service and class of people in the same
community.
(2) When the compensation is so low as to make it impossible for
competent service to be rendered.
(3) When there is underbidding by physicians in order to secure the
contract.
(4) When a reasonable dgree of free choice of physicians is denied
those cared for in a community where other competent physicians are
readily available.
(5) When there is solicitation of patients directly or indirectly."
Thus, under the AMA's contract practice ethics, it was unethical for
a physician to provide medical services under a contract when, e.g..
"the compensation received is inadequate based on the usual fees...
Id At X62.
30 Id at SX4.
31 Id at 186.
29

32
33
34
35

Id
Id
Id
Id

it ,X7
at $88
at I(0)9.
at IIl I n.59.

36. Id at 1012. For a comprehensive collection of the AMA's pition through 195Y In
contract practice. including Item (4) guild "free choice." see JAMA. Jan. 17. 1959. at I tpecjal
editonbydevoted
AMA's Report
Medical1983
Care Plans).
Published
History to
andtheScholarship
Digitalon
Archives,
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paid in the same community." or when "there is underbidding by physicians in order to secure the contract" or when "free choice of physician is denied ... .
The Federal Trade Commission applied standard antitrust principles
to the AMA's ethical interest in the adequacy of physician compensation and found they were similar to traditional forms of price-fixing:
It is evident from a facial examination of [the) AMA's ethical provisions and from evidence concerning adoption of these restraints that
they are designed to limit price competition among doctors. Respondent does not suggest any alternative motive cognizable under the antitrust laws . . . . We believe that this restriction is so akin to the more
traditional
- forms of price-fixing that it should be treated in the same
fashion. 8
Of all the contract practice ethics' provisions, however, the AMA's
"free choice" provision is the most important and least understood.
"Free choice" of doctor and hospital sounds so good and wholesome
that few people ever stopped to examine what it really means and how
it was applied. The Commission found, after analysis. that the purpose
of the AMA's "free choice" ethic was "primarily . . .anticompetitive"
and its primary purpose was "suppressing the activities of competitors.
not solicitude for the rights of patients. ""- The Commission's "free
choice" ruling is a landmark in health care law and policy.
Ironically "freedom of choice" is an essential element of both the
AMA and private market models of medical care. Yet the differences
between market "free choice" and AMA "free choice" are profound.
The AMA's "free choice" ethic means that each doctor must be allowed to participate in each health care plan or other insurance arrangement. The AMA's Judicial Council declared "free choice of'
physician . . .expressly requires that any qualified licensed physician
residing in the area in which the plan operates be allowed to participate. "',The practical effect of the AMA's "free choice" ethic is to prohibit physician price competition and health care plans. Market "free
choice," on the other hand, means consumers have a right to choose
between competing groups of providers (health care plans) and traditional insurers on the basis of price, quality, service, and benefits.
Consider, for example, a medical community that is divided into
three distinct groups, each affiliated with an insurance arrangement
called a health care plan. Assume for simplicity that there is only one
conventional insurer, where the benefits permit a consumer to go to any
37 94 F.T.C. at11012.
3H. Id at 1014.
39 Id at 1015. See also A. SOMi;ks & 11.SOM.4S. D "cWTO
S. PArI.'INTS AN D IIItAIII INSUANC. 409-13 (1961); A. ENTIIOV N., II.ALTI PLAN4 77 (19H0).
40. 94 F.T.C. at 903.

https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol14/iss1/4

8

Weller: Antitrust, Joint Ventures and the End of the AMA's Contract Pract

ANTITRUST IN HEAL TH CARE
physician in the community and be indemnified up to the "usual. customary and reasonable" fee. Under market "free choice" consumers
can choose between the health care plans or the conventional insurer
on the basis of their differing premiums, quality, and other factors.
Thus, consumers can freely choose their doctor either at the time they
select a health care plan or, if they choose traditional insurance, at the
time they go to the doctor. Also, under market "free choice," each
health care plan's limited group of doctors has incentives to perform
efficiently, because its health care plan's premiums then can be lower
and the plan's benefits broader.
By contrast, under the AMA's "free choice" ethic each health care
plan is unethical because it excludes, in the example. two-thirds of the
physicians in the community. Health care plans that create incentives
for their physicians to perform efficiently are what the medical profession terms "closed panels." As the AMA's Maryland affiliate affirmed
in 1967. "the closed-panel practice of medicine . . . is an abridgement
of 'freedom of choice.' "" Thus, contrary to the ordinary meaning of
the words "free choice," under AMA "free choice" consumers are denied the right to choose competitive groupings of doctors and insurance.
health care plans. Under the AMA's "free choice" ethic, no matter
which insurer a consumer chooses, every interested doctor is included.
Provider competition over price and efficiency is thus necessarily lost,
as the patient has no incentive to switch from inefficient providers to
efficient ones. As a 1939 AMA publication stated, that was precisely
their intention:
In place of that is essentially "cut-throat price competition" that has so
frequently demoralized business, the medical profession has substituted
the requirement that there be reasonable competition among qualified
physicians. Therefore. the organization of a medical care plan which
gives a few physicians a monopoly on the provision of medical service
for members by denying those members the right to choose their own
physicians from among all qualified physicians in the community has
been opposed by the stipulation in the "Principles of Medical Ethics"
that there be no interference with reasonable competition in a
community. 42
Indeed, the Commission ruled that the AMA's "free choice" ethics
"had the effect of impairing competition from alternative providers"
and discouraged the "use of innovative arrangements that can deliver
services at lower cost."43 In general, the Commission concluded that
the AMA's contract practice ethics, although couched "in terms of
41. Id
42. AMERIC'AN MI.DICAL ASSOCIATION. ORC.ANIZED PAYMEN'IS WK ME.DItCAL Sic.vI'LS 142

(1939).
43. 94 FTC at 1015.
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preventing impairment of medical judgment and deterioration of medical care" infact "bear little relation to those objectives.*" In summarizing the entire case the trial judge concluded. "These ethics
restrictions do not deal with the medical or therapeutic aspects of a
physician's practice: at issue are predominantly restrictions on economic activities." 4' The trial judge ruled that the AMA's ethics deprived "consumers of the free flow of information about the
availability of health care services" and "stifleld]" the rise of almost
every type of health care delivery that could potentially pose a threat to
the income of fee-for-service physicians in private practice."4 The voluminous record in the case could lead to no other conclusion.
The single most important impact of the AMA's contract practice
and "free choice" ethics was how they fundamentally shaped the basic
structure of American health insurance today.
B. The Imnpact of the A A :r Contract Practice Ethic.: Thei Pre.'ni
Sincture of .4merican Health Insurance
In the 1920's and 1930's, there was rapid growth in a form of health
insurance entirely different from the forms that prevail today. "[Tihe
voluntary insurance of 1932 was not the type of voluntary insurance
familiar to us today."4 Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans did not exist.
As a practical matter, commercial insurers did not write health
insurance.4"
The form of insurance that predominated and was growing rapidly
in the 1920's and 1930's was what are now called health care plans.
Hospitals and doctors were breaking into groups competing through
insurance over premiums, efficiency, quality, and benefits:
The real difference between all of those programs and the Blue Cross
and Blue Shield was that all of the early programs provided care in a
single institution under the care of a single group of physicians connected with that institution. All of those early plans were what we
would now call HMOs [health care plansi. There was a cooperative
arrangement between a group of physicians. an institution and a
financing mechanism.4 '
The health care plans that were forming in a competitive market
were generating price competition over premiums and efficiency among
44

94 F.T.C. at 1012.

45. /I at917.
46. Id
47. 0. As." RsO.,. Till UNI ASY E'.)t;L.akItu. I(% (1968).
48. R. EII.ksI
. Ri (.tL AI1)N 01, BLUI. CROSS AND BI.UE. Slll.L

PLA'S 13 (1931
49. 46 I10SI'ItALS 68, 71-72 (1972) (intervtew with John R. Minnix. recipient of the 1974
Justn Ford Kimball Award) See alst P. Wit LIAMSI. Tim. PURt'IIA.I. Of1 Nil t At ('ARI
Tikou(n |iX:it) PIIiOi)m( PAYhI.N' (1932). Leland, Contract Pracu r. 98 J A.M A. 808 11932)
(i)rector of the AMA's Bureau of Medical Economics).
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groups of doctors and hospitals. For this very reason, the AMA House
of Delegates in 1933 endorsed a report that proscribed these plans as
"contract practice schemes:"
One of the pernicious effects of contract practice schemes is that each
of them stimulates the launching of other similar schemes until there
are many in the field competing with each other. The first may have
safeguards against many of the abuses of contract practices, but as new
ones are formed50 the barriers are gradually broken down in order to
secure business.
The AMA and its affiliated societies vigorously applied their contract
practice, "free choice," and other ethics to suppress the health care plan
form of health insurance. For instance, in 1936 the AMA's Judicial
Council enforced the ethics against several physicians affiliated with a
proposed health care plan for International Harvester employees in
Wisconsin."' Similar action led to the AMA's criminal conviction
under the antitrust laws in 1943.52

Over the next few years. the tide began to change. As an AMA Bureau oaj Medical Economic study reported:
T he result of the position taken by medical societies and by hospital
administrators in sympathy with medical ethics was to bring gradually
into disrepute those plans which did not follow the more essential principles that have been outlined. New plans promoted by commercial
agencies or profit-seeking promoters no longer appealed to hospital administrators. The day of the commercial and competitive schemes began to wane and in their stead rose the city-wide. noncommercial
associations of "hospitals designed to offer hospital facilities on a prepayment basis. The contract practice and "free choice" ethics, in addition to being
used to suppress health care plans, were incorporated into the profession's own health insurance plans beginning in 1933:
[l~n 1933. the next stage of the movement toward some form of health
insurance was on its way. The chief providers of services, hospitals and
physicians. had been heard from. They had declared themselves in
favor of some form of voluntary health insurance if sponsored. initiated. and controlled by the respective representatives of the hospital
50. 94 F.T C.at 1013.
51. Id at 899. Another example of Judicial Council enforcement of the contract practice.
advertising, and solicitation ethics is found on the same page. The private enforcement of private
law is. of course, classic cartel conduct. See. e.g.. Fashion Originators* Guild of Am. v. FTC. 312
U.S. 457 (1941).
52. 94 F.T.C. at 899-900; American Med. Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943).
53. AMA BUREAU OF MEDICAL EcoNotics. GROUP IIOSPITALIZATION 41 (1937). See 94
F T C. at 899-907. See also Note. American ,tedical Association: Power. Purpose & Po/incs. 63
YALE L.J. 937. 976-96 (1954): A. SOMERS & H. Som.Rs. supra note 39. at 263-340;. American Mcd.
Ass'n v. United States. 317 U.S. 519 (1943) M. DAVIS. AMERICA ORGANIZES M EDIc.INh (194 1); C.
RAYACK.
PRO-ESSIONAL
POWIF. ANt)
AMERICAN
Ml-t)ICE
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and medical associations.

4

The AMA's contract practice and -free choice" ethics were also incorporated into Medicare and Medicaid, the nation's principal public
health insurance programs." s The perverse incentives of non-price
competition were then pervasively in place.
The Final Order in American Medical Association v. FTC

C.

A Final Order was entered by the Federal Trade Commission

against the AMA on May 19, 1982. The Order prohibits the AMA
from restraining trade under the guise of ethical restrictions on advertising, solicitation, and contract practice. 5' At the same time the Order
expressly permits the AMA to adopt and enforce ethical guidelines reand solicitation of persons
garding -false or deceptive" advertising
'vulnerable to undue influence.""7 The Order also expressly permits
the AMA to conduct "professional peer review of fee practices of
physicians.""
The conduct of the AMA and its affiliates found by the FTC clearly
established the need for an effective order. The essential guild features
0 ADERSOS'. supra note 47. at 104. See also 94 F.T.C. at 753.
See. e.g. Iiarris..4nnas oJfLegisladion: ,edicare (fpts. 1-4). Nr.w YORKi:R. July 2. 9. l0.
23. 1966 A. SOlERs & II. SOMERS. MEI)ICARE At) TIlE HOSPITALS (1967).
5t Part I is directed at advertising and solicitation, and prohibits the AMA from restricting:
A . . . the advertising or publishing by any person of the prices. terms or conditions of
sale of physicians" services, or of information about physicians' services. facilities or equip.
ment which arc offered for sale or made available by physicians or by any organization with
%hich physicians arc affiliated:
B.
. the solicitation, through advertising or by any other means, including but not
limited to bidding practices, of patients. patronage. or contracts to supply physicians' scrvicc.%.
by any ph)sician or by any organization with which physicians are affiliated:
Nothing contained in this Pan shall prohibit respondent from formulating. adopting. or
dis.eminating to its constituent and component medical organizations and to its members.
and enlrcing reasonable ethical guidelines governing the AMA's conduct of its members
with respect to representations, including unsubstantiated representations, that respondent
reasonably believes would be false or deceptive within the meaning of Section 5 of the Fed.
cral Trade Commission Act. or with respect to uninvited, in-person solicitation of actual or
potential patients. who. because of their particular circumstances, are vulnerable to undue
influence.
Part II is directed at contract practice. and prohibits the AMA from restricting:
A . . the consideration offered or provided to any physician in any contract with any
entity that offers physicians' services to the public, in return for the sale. purchase or distribution of his or her professional services. except for professional peer review of fee practices of
physicians.
B. . .. the growth. development or operations of any entity that offers physicians' scrvices to the public, by means of any statement or other representation concerning the ethical
propriety of medical service arrangements that limit the patient's choice of a physician:
C. . . . the growth. development or operations of any entity that offers physicians' serviccs to the public, by means of any statement or other representation concerning the ethical
propriety of participation by non-physicians in the ownership or management of said organi.4

55

zation: ....

57. Id. pt. I.
58. Id. p1. I1.
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of the contract practice, "free choice" advertising and solicitation ethics
had never been repealed or abandoned.
First, the AMA and its affiliates continued to enforce these ethics
after their criminal conviction in 1943, 59 as repeated examples of post1943 enforcement attest.6°
Second, the AMA and its affiliates did not abandon the anticompetitive application of their "free choice" ethics after they made historic
and laudatory language changes in their "free choice" ethics in June,
1959.t Less than six months after the AMA House of Delegates
adopted the recommendation of the Larson Report permitting closed
panel plans, the House of Delegates changed its mind. In 1959. the
AMA House of Delegates disapproved the concept of closed panel
practice. 2 The anticompetitive conduct by the AMA and its affiliates
continued after 1959 as if the June 1959 changes had never been made.
For example. from 1969 until after the FTC suit was filed, the Harvard
Community Health Plan had continuing restrictions placed on its advertising." From 1970 through December 1976, the Arizona Health
Plan was harassed because it was "no different than a Kaiser-type
closed-panel system and was 'unacceptable' to organized medicine. '
In December 1976, the New Haven County Medical Society disparaged
HMOs as "socialized medicine." The AMA's ethics were also used to
undercut the operation of the Florida Health Care Plan throughout the
59. American Med. Ass'n v. United States. 317 U.S. 519 (1943).
60. 94 F.T.C. at 808-911. 1002-18.
61. Professors Somers and Somers described the historic change in the AMA's "free choice"
language in their invaluable book. A. SOMERS & H-. SOMERs. DOC TORS. PATI.STS. AND Iil-.AL111
INSURA wE 355 (1961):

[Tjhe official AMA policy with respect to closed panel practice underwent a far-reaching
change. Its longstanding opposition to this type of health insurance, primarily in the name of
*'freechoice." was abandoned in favor of the flexible policy set forth in the Larson Report
that the individual
recommendations adopted by the House of Delegates in June. 1959.
should have free choice of either his physician or his medical plan.
The specific language. based on the Larson Report. is contained in an AMA interpretation of its
"free choice" ethics adopted in June. 1959. in a simple clause adding the language "preferred
system of medical care:"
FREE CHOICE OF PHYSICIAN
The American Medical Association believes that free choice of physician is the right of
every individual and one which he should be free to exercise as he chooses:
Each individual should be accorded the privilege to select and change his physician at will
or to select his preferred system of medical care and the American Medical Association vigorously supports the right of the individual to choose between these alternatives:
Lest there be any misunderstanding, we state unequivocally that the American Medical
Association firmly subscribes to freedom of choice of physician and free competition among
physicians as being prerequisites of optimal medical care. The benefits of any system which
p,ovides medical care must be judged on the degree to which it allows or abridges such
freedom of choice and such competition.
Id at 341.
62. 94 F.T.C. at 903.
63. Id at 833.
at 831.
Published64.by Id
History
and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1983
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1970's."5 As late as June 1977, doctors affiliated with this plan continued to be harassed, just as doctors affiliated with health care plans have
been harassed for over fifty years.66 Interestingly, the 1981 version of
the AMA's "free choice" ethics are materially unchanged from the version the AMA adopted in June 1959.
Third, AMA officials took positions in 1981-1982 that are virtually
unchanged from fifty years ago. Although the positions were taken
with respect to legislation, they are relevant in showing the intent with
which the AMA's vague 1981 Opinions might be applied to private

markets without an effective order in place."7 For example, a recent
report from the AMA's Board of Trustees. which was adopted by the
House of Delegates, criticized the "pro-competition" bills before Congress along lines unchanged from the early 1930's. The report says:
Sponsors of insurance plans particularly under the more comprehensive competitive models, would be expected to exercise their purchasing
power to control selection of providers and facilities through special
arrangements with them. The availability of care to plan subscribers
would be governed by such arrangements. with controls established to
limit costs and thus create a competitive advantage.

The report continues:
These ends would be fostered through provider contracts, closed
panel arrangements. negotiated fee schedules. and a greater reliance on
large group practices, where costs theoretically could be lowered
through strict internal controls."
Also, a September 19. 1981 American Medical News article, Top ALMA

Leader Assails Gephardt's "Competifion" Plan, indicates the AMA favors some features of the competitive proposals but conspicuously excludes the most important element-health care plans:
Specifically, the AMA favors changes in the market place that would:
Provide consumers with multiple-choice insurance options.
65. Id at 829-30. 906.
66. Id. at 907.
67. United Mine Workers v. Pennington. 381 U.S. 657. 670-71 n.3 (1965). The AMA revi.tons also use vague language. rather than the approach recommended by the Supreme Court in
National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs v. United States. 435 U.S. 679. 699 (1978) (quoting United States v.
National Soc'y. of Prof. Eng'rs. 555 F.2d 978. 983 1D.C. Cir. 1977)). of developing "ethical guidelines more closely confined to. . . lcgitimate objctivelsl.'" Id. at 699. The AMA's contract practice ethics were untouched by an April. 1976 AMA statement on advertising and solicitation.
Brief for AppellLnt at 6-7. 435 U.S. 679 (1978). The 1977 and 1981 editions of the AMA's Judicial
Council Opinions did not delete the contract practice ethics. They reverted to broad statements
similar to the original Principles of Medical Ethics.
68. Competition Legislation is Critici-ed. Am. Med. News. June 19-26. 1981. at I. col. 4. An
AMA delegate recently described the Enthoven competitive health plan proposals to be "socialized medicine" because, in essence, they were inconsistent with these illegal ethics against physician price competition. Rogers. Pro-competition Bills and Sociali:d ,lediine. Am. Med. News.
May 8. 1981, at 8, col. 3.
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0 Require equal employer contribution to any plan regardless of the
coverage.
* Supply a non-taxable rebate to employees when the plan they
choose costs less than the employer contribution.
* Limit the amount of tax-deductible premium payments that the employer can claim.
* Prohibit tax deductions for unqualified plans.6'
Without health care plans and their competitive collections of doctors.
the AMA's changes only perpetuate the present competition among insurers that follow guild "free choice" ethics and fail to introduce competition among physicians with respect to efficiency. Finally, the
February 24, 1981 Wall Street Journal quotes the AMA's Executive
Vice President, Dr. James Sammons, as being "violently opposed" to
any cutback in "free choice" for Medicaid patients."0 There is no
sound reason to believe the AMA and its affiliates would react any differently to changes in their guild "free choice- ethics for any other type
of patients absent an effective order.
Finally, it should be noted that the FTC's Order does not encroach
on the power or authority of the states. If anything the Order enhances
the authority of the states, since it is directed at private guilds that were
found to have usurped governmental powers."'
Accordingly, a fair and effective injunctive order against the AMA
was justified. At the same time, the amended Order gives the AMA
and its affiliates the ability to address false and deceptive practices, as
well as abusive fee practices of physicians. Although the AMA argued
in the Supreme Court that the Order prohibits medical societies from
preventing the "terrible tragedy that can result from deceptive advertising" and from addressing "fee gouging and secret fee splitting arrangements, ' 72 it is apparent from reading the Order that it does not.
Accordingly, the Federal Trade Commission's Order against the AMA,
and continuing FTC antitrust jurisdiction over the medical profession,
are vital to private market solutions to the nation's health care
problems.
III.

A.

FUNDAMENTAL ANTITRUST CONCEPTS
3

FundamentalAntitrust Principles1

The antitrust laws, the Supreme Court has observed, are a "charter
69.
70.
J.. Feb.
71.
72.
(1978).
73.

Competition Legislation is Crticized. Am. Med. News. June 19-26. 1981. at 1. col. 4.
Schorr. Reagan "r ttedicaid Plan Stirs Fear of Twv.Class Health Care System. WALL ST.
24. 1981. at 29. col. 4.
See, e.g.. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry. 438 U.S. 531. 548.49. 553-54 (1978).
Brief for Appellant at 10-11. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry. 438 U.S. 531
This article does not discuss antitrust exemptions because they have been so sharply
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of economic liberty" that rest on the assumption that a free market
economy will provide the highest quality, lowest prices, best allocation
of resources, and greatest material progress:
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as a
rule of trade. It rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of
competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources. the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material
progress, while at the same time providing an environment conductive
to the preservation of our democratic political and social institutions.' 4
The rule of reason is the basic standard used in applying Section One
of the Sherrran Antitrust Act. Contracts, combinations, and conspiracies that unreasonably restrain trade are illegal. Contrary to its name.
the rule of reason does not permit an inquiry into every argument that
may fall within the realm of reason. Instead. "it focuses directly on the
challenged restraint's impact on competitive conditions." - In effect.
the rule of reason is a balancing test that weighs the competitive harms
and benefits of any given arrangement. The test of legality is whether
the procompetitive benefits outweigh the anticompetitive harms. The
per se doctrine is a special case of the rule of reason. It applies when
the anticompetitive effects of an arrangement far outweigh its procompetitive benefits,6 as in the case of price-fixing, market division, and
group boycotts.7
Despite the deceptive familiarity of the assumptions underlying the
antitrust laws, they represent in practice a fundamentally different
world view for health care professionals. Nowhere is the difference
perhaps greater, or more important, than in the areas of joint action,
and price competition among providers.
The health professions have traditionally assumed that the greatest
benefits to society result when health care economic issues are addressed by all affected parties acting jointly through guilds. Thus. an
economic issue affecting all hospitals was assumed to be-best addressed
narrowed by the Supreme Court in recent years. The "learned profession" exemption was
The special
rejected unanimously in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar. 421 U.S. 773 (1975
treatment the health care industry received on the "interstate commerce" issue ended in Hospital
Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex liosp.. 425 U.S. 738 (1976). The state action exemption. McCarran
Ferguson Act insurance exemption. and implied repeal doctrine have either been sharply
narrowed over the last seven years or strictly applied to the health care field as elsewhere. See.
e.g.. Weller. The 'Wew",'ACarran Fergpson Ac Antitrust Exemption After Barr'. 49 INs. Cou.,s.
J. 29 (1983). National Gerimedical liosp. v. Blue Cross. 452 U.S. 378 (1981). See general?), Sims.
Ihat Is Left of The TraditionalDefenses?. National Health Lawyers Ass'n Fifth Annual Program
on Antitrust in the Health Care Field (May. 1982).
74. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States. 356 U.S. I. 4 (1958).
75. National Stcpy of Prof. Engrs v. United States. 435 U.S. 679. 688 (1978).
76. See generaly L. SULLIVA.. ANTITRUST 186-97 (1977). See also .lartpcpa. 102 S. Ci.
2466. 2472-75 (1982) (for discussion by the Supreme Court).
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by all the hospitals joining together to find and implement a solution.
Free market economics and the antitrust rest on opposite assumptions.
The best results for society are assumed to result from the independent
actions of all affected parties, buyers and sellers alike. That is what the
Supreme Court meant by the phrase "the unrestrained interaction of
competitive forces." That is why the basic antitrust law, Section One of
the Sherman Act, generally prohibits joint action on private market
economic issues as a "conspiracy in restraint to trade."
In addition, a free market requires and the antitrust laws protect incentives for sellers such as health care providers to render high quality
service at the lowest cost. Price competition is the principal incentive
for efficiency and, thus, is in the Supreme Court's terms "the central
nervous system" of a private market." As previously indicated, however, price competition is rejected in the guild model.
B.

FundamentalPrinciples of Antitrust Joint Venture Law

Small groups of competitors, including hospitals and doctors, often
can join together to achieve efficiencies and to become more competitive without violating the antitrust laws. In antitrust terminology these
arrangements are referred to as "partial integrations" or "joint ventures." A joint venture in some respects is a "qua.i-merger" where independent entities such as hospitals and doctors partially integrate their
production, managerial, financial, or other operations. On a scale, joint
ventures are between mergers, which are complete integrations, and
cartels, which involve little or no integration.
There are two basic antitrust requirements for joint ventures to be
lawful under the antitrust laws:
[Flirst, the elimination of price [or other] competition between the participating firms must result directly from the partial integration of their
functions; second, this elimination of price for other] competition must
not appear to significantly reduce marketwide competition.m
One of the decisive factors under the second requirement, the impact
on market-wide competition, is the combined market share of the participating firms. Generally speaking, it is thus possible to restate the
two basic requirements as follows: First, the restraint must be a neces77. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.. 310 U.S. 150. 224-26 n.59 (1940).
78. L. SULLIVAN.supra note 76. at 206. See, e.g.. Broadcast Music. Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys.. Inc.. 441 U.S. 1 (1979); University of Okla. v. NCAA, 707 F.2d 1147 (loth Cir. 1983).
cert. granted. 52 U.S.L.W. 3309 (U.S. Oct. 10. 1983) (No. 83-271): U.S. v. Columbia Pictures
Industries. Inc.. 507 F. Supp. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). See generally Brodley. Joint Ventures andAntitrust Policy. 95 HARV.*L. REV. 1521 (1982). R. BoRY. TIE ANTITRUST PARADOX 279 (1978);
Pitofsky. Joint Ventures Under the Antitrust Laws: Some Reflections on the Signicance of PennOlin. 82 HARv. L. REV. 1007, 1016 (1969): In re Brunswick Corp.. 94 F.T.C. 1174 (1979), aed.
657 F.2d 971 (8th Cir. 1979), cer. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1768 (1982).
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sary part of a legitimate joint venture; second, the combined market
share of the participants must be small."
Taken together, the basic antitrust requirements for joint ventures
and partial integrations can be referred to as the "small groups can be
beautiful" rule. The Supreme Court's Arizona Y. Maricopa Counr)'
Medical Society decision on June 18, 1982 provides a timely illustration
of joint venture law and the first requirement of the "small groups can
be beautiful" rule.' 0 The second requirement of this rule is basically
that the combined market share of the competitors involved be "small.The Supreme Court did not reach this issue in Manricopa. since the first
requirement had not been met."' The second requirement derives from
the rule of reason's balancing approach, which allows groups of competitors to get together to achieve efficiencies or become more competitive so long as the procompetitive gains outweigh the competitive
losses. One of the most important indicators of the loss of competition
is the combined market share of the participants. That is,
how much of
the competition is subject to the restraint? Obviously, if all competitors
are involved, all competition has been eliminated and a competitive
market cannot operate. If only a small group of competitors are involved, however, the remaining competitors provide competition to the
small group and a competitive market does exist. Ronald G. Carr. currently Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Antitrust Division of
the Department of Justice, summarized the applicable joint venture
principles when he stated that the Division "will challenge the broad
inclusion of more competitors then are necessary for efficient joint venture operation where the organization of rival joint ventures is a viable
alternative." ' 2
When is a horizontal combination of doctors or hospitals "small."
79. Prof. Sullivan elaborates on this requirement for partial integrations and joint venture.The second condition.

requires the court to look at structure at least in a truncated way.

If the arrangement appears likely to dampen price competition maiket-wide by ending price
competition between participants. it will be per se unlawful despite the integration. To tell
whether it is likely to affect the market significantly, the court must evaluate power.
. . . flow large must the market shares of participating firms be in order to warrant the
conclusion that price competition is significantly affected? low is the market to be defined
for answering the question? In general. the cases do not insist on any elaborate market definition. . . and seldom look to substitutes. The aggregate shares of the participating firms need
not be exceedingly high - certainly they need not even begin to approach monopoly. If in
the aggregate the shares are large enough so that an end to price competition between the
participants will be noticed, then market-wide competition is affected.
L. SULLIVAN. supra note 76. at 209-10.
80. See infra text accompanying notes 92-104.
81. Significantly, the Supreme Court characterized the group of physicians involved--comprising between 30%-SO% of local physicians-as "a group with substantial power in the market
for medical services.
AMaricopa. 102 S.Ct. at 2478 n.29. On the size of the physician groups.
see id.at 2471 n.8.
82. Feb. 24. 1982 speech. "Some Observations on Information Exchange and Membership
Practices." Hiealth policy analysis is similar. See infra part I.C.
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and when it is it "large?" Although the basic concept of a combined
market share is simple, its application to specific situations is often
complex and fact-intensive. What market or markets are involved ,3
and how does the joint venture relate to them? How much market
power does the group have? These questions are rarely answered easily. As a practical matter, it is advisable to at least consider the combined market share of the joint venturers in the physician and hospital
markets separately. What is the combined market share of the hospital
joint venturers? What is the combined market share of the physician
joint venturers?

Professor Brodley's recent article on joint venture law" comprehensively examines many of these issues. For example, he defines a horizontal joint venture as "a joint venture in the markets in which the
parents compete.""5 Under Professor Brodley's standards, horizontal
joint ventures raise threshold antitrust concerns when the provider
market is concentrated and the collective market share of the parents is
only fifteen percent. "b At first blush the physician market is unconcentrated, since most physicians practice as solo practitioners and, thus,
there are many firms with relatively small market shares. However,
Brodley properly states that the term "oligopolistic market" describes a
market that is "structurally noncompetitive." '
As indicated earlier,
provider markets in the United States are structurally noncompetitive.
because there is virtually no provider price competition."8 On one
hand, horizontal joint ventures composed of fifteen percent or more of
the local physicians should be presumptively unlawful. A "small
group," on the other hand, would be a group with under fifteen percent
of local physicians. Probably the most lenient antitrust analyst would
draw the line around forty percent.8 9
As a practical matter in the health care field it generally will make no
difference whether the line is drawn at fifteen percent or forty percent.
The "small group" concept goes to the heart of the different assumptions underlying the antitrust laws and traditional guild assumptions.
Even a forty percent maximum means that the traditional guild approach of gathering together most or all providers to jointly take action
on economic issues will be unlawful. Under the antitrust laws, the key
83. See also Edwards. Joffe. Kolasky. McGowan. Mendez-Penate. Ordover. Proger. Solomon
& Toepke. Proposed Reyisions of the Jusice Departmentr Mferger Guidelines, 81 COLUNI.

L. R-v.

1543 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Edwards]; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE. MERGER GUIDELINES
(June 14, 1982).

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Brodley. supra note 78.
Id at 1552.
Id at 1553.
Id at 1543.
See mpra text accompanying notes 4-10.

89- See, e.g.. R. BORK. supra note 78. at 279.
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point for the guild model is that all affected parties generally cannot
participate. The health care field's traditional assumption that it is best
to include a high percentage of the provider community in joint action
affecting economic issues simply violates the second requirement of the
"small groups can be beautiful" rule.
The second requirement's concern with combined market share is
consistent with an area of antitrust with which most people are more
familiar-mergers. One of the decisive factors in determining the individual legality of mergers by competitors is the individual market
shares of the merging firms as well as their combined market share.
One recent analysis of antitrust merger law recommended that a horizontal merger should be presumed unlawful if the combined market
share of the merging parties was ten percent or higher."
In the health care field, several hospital mergers have been challenged when the merging parties' combined market share was considered too large. For example, in United States v. Hospital Affiliates
International Inc.. the merger allegedly would have given the combined defendants 100% of the market for private psychiatric hospital
beds in a defined region. A second hospital merger case. In reAmerican
Medical International.Inc., challenged a merger that allegedly would
have combined sixty-eight percent of the hospital beds in a county into
one firm. The merging parties were not a "small group," and that fact
coupled with other relevant issues led to the merger being challenged.
On the other hand, hospital mergers by two hospitals with 'smaller"
combined market shares can be lawful. 9 '
In summary, joint venture antitrust law and the "small groups can be
beautiful" rule provide a basic yet powerful tool for antitrust analysis
in the health care field. Competing health care providers can act
jointly on private economic issues without violating the antitrust laws if
two requirements are met: first, the joint restraint is a necessary part of
a legitimate joint venture, and second, the combined market share of
the participants is "small."
IV.

ANTITRUST AND JOINT VENTURE LAW APPLIED TO THE
HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY

A.

Maricopa Count'
Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society9 2 involved non-profit

90. Edwards.supra note 85. at 1561. Seealso P. AREEDA & D. TURNER. ANTITRUST LAW $
915. at 4(1980) (13-14% market share): L. SULLVAN. supra note 76. at 293 (114): Brodley..supra
note 81. at 1553 (15%). Bork is the most lenient with a 40%maximum. R. BoRK.supra note 78. at
222. Thus. generally speaking none would allow groups of competitors larger than 40%.
9 1. See upra note 90.
92. 102 S. Ct. 2466 (1982).
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medical care foundations established by two medical societies. The
challenged restraint concerned the foundation's provision of a payment-in-full program for insurance companies through a maximum fee
agreement. The Maricopa Foundation is composed of approximately
1,750 doctors, representing about seventy per cent of the private practitioners in Maricopa County. The Pima Foundation for Medical Care
includes about 400 member doctors. The percentage of Pima County
doctors belonging to the foundation was disputed but was between
thirty percent and eighty percent.
Under the payment-in-full plan, member doctors agreed to a maximum schedule of fees. The maximum fee schedules were established
by majority vote of the foundation member physicians. Member doctors have no other financial interest in the operation of the foundations.
The fee schedules limited the amount member doctors could be paid
for services performed for patients insured by insurers approved by the
foundations. In return, the insurers agreed to pay the doctors* charges
up to the scheduled amcunts. Thus, patients insured by a foundationendorsed insurer were guaranteed full payment for their medical bills
when they were treated by a member physician.
The Supreme Court. in an incisive four to three decision, applied
standard antitrust principles to the special facts of the health care field
and held the foundations' maximum fee agreements13 wereper se illegal as horizontal price-fixing by physicians.
The defendants argued that their fee agreements made it possible to
provide consumers of health care with a uniquely desirable form of
insurance coverage that could not otherwise exist:
The features of the foundation-endorsed insurance plans that they
stress are a choice of doctors, complete insurance coverage, and lower
premium. 4
The Supreme Court found, however, that the defendants' contentions
were not supported by fact. A choice of doctors and payment-in-full
insurance coverage were "hardly unique to these plans. First, the Court noted that in most parts of the country existing insur93. Horizontal "'maximum" fee agreements initially may appear beneficial to consumers and
the public. "Maximum" suggests that. unlike the usual price-fixing agreement. prices are being
lowered rather than raised. However, a cartel price-fixing agreement is in'effect a maximum fee
agreement. since any cartel member that tries to charge a higher price will not make any sale..
More specifically. the Supreme Cour's careful attention to the special facts of the health care
industry revealed that appearances are indeed deceiving. The Jfaricapa'medicalsocieties" foundations in effect were collectively bargaining prices on behalf of their physician members to prevent a more competitive alternative: insurer bargaining with physicians individually. The
maximum fee agreement thus prevented physician fees from dropping to a competitively determined lower level. Id
'4. Id at 2477.
95. Id

Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1983

21

North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 14, No. 1 [1983], Art. 4

24

NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL L4;WJOURNAL

ers pay about the same percentage of doctor bills in full (seventy percent) and provide the samc degree of choice as the Maricopa
foundations.
Second, the Court found that even if participating agreements guaranteeing payment in full according to a maximum fee schedule were
desirable. "it is not necessary that the doctors do the price-fixing.' " ' As
an example, the Court cited the Arizona Comprehensive Medical/Dental Program for Foster Children where the "maximum fee
schedule is prescribed by a state agency rather than by the doctors.""7
The Court also cited Group Life & Healih Insurance Co. . Royal Drug
Co."8 for the proposition that "insurers are capable not only of fixing
maximum reimbursable prices but also of obtaining binding agreements with providers guaranteeing the insured full reimbursement of a
participating provider's fee." 9 Finally, in a footnote, the Court
pointed to the Justice Department's position that it is lawful under the
antitrust laws for an insurer to fix the fee schedule and enter into bilateral contracts with individual doctors."
Accordingly, the Court concluded "nothing in the record even arguably supports the conclusion
that this type of insurance program could not function if the fee schedules were set in a different way."''
The Court also ruled that the foundations could not escape per se
treatment as joint ventures. The Court held the medical foundations
were not joint ventures because the participating physicians had not
partially integrated their practices:
The foundations are not analogous to partnerships or other joint arrangements in which persons who would otherwise be competitors pool
their capital and shate the risks of loss as well as the opportunities for

profit. In such joint ventures, the partnership is regarded as a single
firm competing with other sellers in the market. 02
The Court also pointed out that it was not necessary for physicians to
set the maximum fee schedule since, e.g.. an insurer could do it: "Even
if a fee schedule is therefore desirable it is not necessary that the doctors do the price fixing . .

.

.[N]othing in the record even arguably

supports the conclusion that this type of insurance program could not
function if the fee schedules were set in a different way."'" 3 Not having
met the first requirement for a joint venture, the medical foundations'
fee agreement was ruled a naked restraint andperse illegal as horizon96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id
Id. at 2478.
440 U.S. 205 (1979).
Id
102 S. Ct. at 2477 n.26.
Id at 2477.

Id
Id
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tal price-fixing."
B.

Medical Staff Boycotts

Hospitals are protected by the antitrust laws from medical staff boycotts. Many hospital medical staffs are composed of physicians who
are independent contractors. If the physicians agree to take joint action
to force a hospital to adhere to their wishes, their joint action to force a
hospital to adhere to their wishes rarely will meet the "small groups can
be beautiful" rule's first requirement. It is not a legitimate joint venture under the antitrust law when competitors join together solely to
achieve -strength in numbers" or "clout." Collective action to exclude
a new competitor or to exclude a new form of competition in this manner usually constitutes aper se illegal group boycott. For example. the
Maryland Attorney General took action against the staff of the Harford
Memorial Hospital when it allegedly boycotted the hospital's efforts to
negotiate a new contract with hospital radiologists."t 5 Similarly. the
Federal Trade Commission sued all five members of the medical staff
of the Brownfield. Texas Regional Medical Center when they allegedly
boycotted the hospital's efforts to contract with new physicians recruited to the area. The physicians entered a consent decree barring
them from jointly refusing to provide emergency room coverage, perform administrative functions. and refer or accept patients from the
newly-recruited doctors.10 6
C.

Collectire Bargainingbr Purchasers

Can purchasers such as companies and insurers who individually
have little clout with hospitals group together and collectively bargain
for lower hospital rates? Generally speaking, the "small groups can be
beautiful" rule provides a ready answer: "no." In many circumstances
collective bargaining by a large group of purchasers will almost surely
violate the "small group" requirement. The antitrust concerns with
collective bargaining by a large group of insurers are confirmed by the
Health Insurance Association of America's (HIAA) interest in an anti104. The rationale ofMaoricopa has been criticized as being inconsistent with Chicago SchoX)l
of Economics analysis. See Easterbrook. Maximum Price.Fixing. 48 U. Cifi. L. REv. 886 (1981):
Gerhart. The Supreme Court andAntirutAnayrs& The (Near) Triumph ofthe Chicago School. 82
SuP. CT. Ruv. 3i9. The fundamental flaw in both critiques is their attempt to decide cases by
theory and assumed facts as opposed to the facts in the record; that is. to substitute one view of
economic analysis for the judicial process itself.
Justice Stevens. on the other hand. was true to the
judicial process. and provided a particularly penetrating analysis in Aforicopa of the facts in the

record.
105. Maryland v. Medical Staff of Harford Memorial Hosp.. 1981-2 TRADE CAS. (CCH) J
64.430 (1981).
106. /n re Hope. 98 F.T.C. 66 (1981).
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trust exemption for collective bargaining."
These concerns exist even
though the commercial insurers represented by the HIAA nationally
account for approximately only twenty percent of hospital revenues.
As indicated earlier, a twenty percent combined market share, depending on other factors, may not constitute a "small group." Yet collective

bargaining by a small group of purchasers can survive antitrust challenge under the "small groups can be beautiful" rule. This same principle is seen in the next example.
D. Joint Purchasing B;' Hospitals
Joint purchasing arrangements by hospitals provide a clear illustration of antitrust joint venture law and the "small groups can be beautiful" rule. Efficiencies result from this joint action and partial
integration, since economies of scale .,i volume purchasing may be involved. Moreover, as long as the purchasing group accounts for only a
"small" portion-of the products purchased and does not engage in other
anticompetitive practices, they are perfectly lawful. For example. the
United States Department of Justice recently issued a favorable letter
concerning the business review of a proposal that would make group
purchasing available to all Ohio hospitals.'
In the letter, the Department said it does not intend to launch an antitrust challenge against a
program that would establish a statewide group purchabing consortium
of Ohio-based, not-for-profit. local group purchasing programs. The
Ohio Hospital Purchasing Consortium (OHPC), designed to help control hospital costs, would combine eight existing group purchasing programs in Ohio representing 160 of the 240 not-for-profit hospitals in the
state. OHPC would make group purchasing on selected items available
to all Ohio hospitals. Agreeing that the proposal could result in further
cost containment by hospitals, the Department said it does not think
the program would "restrain trade in any particular product market."
Further, the Department found that the proposal adequately provides
for competitive bidding by suppliers and that as a result the suppliers
may be able to reduce costs of storage. inventory control, contract negotiations, and delivery.10°
107. lir.ALTII INSURAs4C
SYST0.h 12 (March 1981).

AssocIATt0OJ OF AsIFRICA. Compii-rTION IN4 TIlE llt:ALTII CAstI!

108. Justice Dept. Business Revicw letter to Ohio Hlospital Association (June 9. 1982).
109. Curiously. one court recently stated that. 'Group purchasing may bring about substantial
savings to the individual hospitals within the group." and then ruled the group purchasing practices involved were unlawful. White & White v. American Flosp. Supply Corp.. 42 AS.TITRUST &
TRADE Rh(. REP. (BNA) 884. 914 (W.D. Mich. 1982). The ruling underscores the need for careful antitrust counselling before 'undertaking any activity with antitrust implications.
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E.

Collective Negotiation of HospitalReimbursement Formulas

Probably the classic conflict between antitrust and traditional guild
thinking about health care economics involves the collective negotiation of hospital reimbursement formulas. Historically, hospitals in
some localities became accustomed to negotiating reimbursement formulas collectively with major insurers such as Blue Cross. Collective
negotiations by hospitals may seem only "fair," since an individual
hospital naturally would feel overwhelmed dealing with a larger buyer
by itself. Yet collective bargaining by 100% of local hospitals, even
with a dominant insurer, is less "fair." No single insurer accounts for
close to 100% of hospital revenues, and thus no single insurer could
begin to effectively bargain with a collective hospital monopoly. In any
event, the antitrust law of joint ventures does apply: collective bargaining of reimbursement formulas by large groups of hospitals are likely
to be held per se illegal price-fixing."

F. ParticipatingContracts and Other InsuranceArrangements With
Limited Groups of Providers
A large number of antitrust cases have been brought by health care
providers challenging insurance company participating contracts as
,price-fixing" or "boycotts.""' Typically the plaintiff-providers charge
higher prices than allowed under the participating contract. The plaintiff-providers allege that an insurer's effort to get them to lower their
prices is "price-fixing," and that the effect of the participating contract,
shifting patients to participating providers, is a "boycott." Other insurance arrangements with much more limited groups of providers are
likely to emerge as well.'1 2 Antitrust cases against these arrangements
are likewise possible, again alleging "price-fixing" and "boycotts."
This example is included even though it does not involve a joint venture. The "small groups can be beautiful" rule is inapplicable because
there is no group action by competitors. It is included because it illus!0.

In re Michigan State Medical Soc'y. 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCIt)

21.991 (1983). See also

.. SULLIVAN.Jupra note 76. at 285-89, Justice Dept. Business Review letter to California Pharmaceutical Association (Nov. I. 1976); Justice Dept. Business Review letter to Michigan Pharmacies'

Collective Fee Negotiating Agent (Aug. 15. 1978).
111. See. e.g.. Sausalito Pharmacy. Inc. v. Blue Shield of Cal.. 1982-2 TRADE- CAS. (CCII)
64.766 (9th Cir. 1982): Anderson v. Medical Serv. of the Dist. of Columbia. 551 F.2d 304 (4th Cir.
1977); Kanell v. Blue Shield of Mass., Inc.. 592 F.2d 1191 (Ist Cir. 1979): Grigg v. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield of Mich.. Inc.. No. 772990 (E.D. Mich. filed Dec. 22. 1977) (physicians): Enright.
Doctors v. Blue Shield- The First Big Battle. 55 MED. EcoN. 23 (1978). See also Group Life &

liealth Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co.. 440 U.S. 205 (1979): Manasen v. Cal. Dental Serv., 1981-1
TRADE CAS. (CCH) 1 63.959 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (dentist); Doctors. Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater
Phila.. 557 F.2d 1001 (3d Cir. 1976) (hospitals).
112. See. e.g.. FAH REv., July-Aug. 1982. at I (whole issue devoted to Preferred Provider
Organizations).
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trates a fundamental misunderstanding of private markets and antitrust
principles by some health care professionals. Typically these contracts
are between a buyer and seller, such as an insurer and a provider.
They are what the Supreme Court termed "merely arrangements for
the purchase of goods or services." 't 3 Under the antitrust laws, buyers
are expected only to look and contract for the best services at the best
price. As the first court to decide the issue stated: "What plaintiffs
describe as price-fixing is. in fact, no more than a natural consumeroriented competitive activity in getting the lowest competitive price."'t4
As to the "boycott" charge, the same court stated: "An unlawful boycott will not result from a buyer's refusal to pay a higher price for
goods or services where it can buy them at a lower price."' - Accordingly. participating contracts and other insurance ai:angements with
limited groups of providers are basically procompetitive and generally
lawful under the antitrust laws. so long -s the insurer is independent of
provider control. The situation where the insurer is controlled by providers follows.
G. Provider Con;rolledInsutrance Plans
The preceding example may suggest to sonic health care professionals that the antitrust laws leave them defenseless. Hospitals and other
providers are increasingly faced with alternative insurance plans. Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs), health care plans with limited
provider groups, and HMOs are developing in more and more communities around the country. Can hospitals group together to sponsor or
affiliate with HMOs, health care plans, or PPOs without violating the
antitrust laws?'' 6
Antitrust joint venture law does apply here. More specifically. small
groups of hospitals and other providers can combine in a variety of
insurance arrangements to offer their services on the basis of quality,
price, and service. On the other hand, large groups of providers catolo
lawfully combine to form a single insurer under basic antitrust principles governing horizontal joint ventures.
Consider, for example, a city with ten hospitals and assume that each
hospital develops an alternative insurance plan with its medical staff.
One hospital and its medical staff agrees to offer specified services for a
113

Group Life & liealth Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. at 214.

114.

Chick's Auto Body v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.. 1979-1 TRAt)L CAS. (CCII)

f 77.634-35 (N.J. Super Ct. Law Div. 1979).
115.

Id

62.642. at

.

116. For a more extensive analysis. see Weller.4nwtrust and Hleath Care: Prowtder Controlled
fleath Plans and et .1laricopa Decision. 8 AM. J.L. & MiIt). 223 (1982): McClure & Wcllcr. Ca'mpeition and ihe flealth Care Plan Theraps'for 3ledical,tnakets; .4n .4nttrust. Polico'. and Iistor'wl
Slnihe.r (furthcoming).
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monthly premium through an arrangement with an existing insurer
new to the area. Another hospital organizes an HMO, contracts for
physician services with its medical staff, and opens several satellite outpatient centers to serve its HMO patients. Another hospital's medical
staff sponsors an HMO and contracts with the hospital for hospital
services. Yet another hospital and its medical staff enter a PPO agreement with a local employer. The PPO offers discounts and includes
incentives for both the hospital and physicians to reduce hospital utilization. All of these examples, if properly put together, can comply with
the "small groups can be beautiful" rule and antitrust joint venture
law.
The lawful, small group arrangements represent new types of cooperation by providers and new forms of competition. The new cooperations may be multi-disciplinary, involving hospitals and their medical
staffs. The new forms of competition provide competition by the small
group of hospitals and providers over efficiency as well as quality and
service with other providers and insurers. They are generally procompetitive and lawful.
From an antitrust perspective, the key is recognizing that each of
these plans compete in more than the insurance market. Most importantly. they compete in provider markets as well. Every time a subscriber or employee chooses one of these plans, he or she has chosen its
..small group" of providers over all others and has chosen that insurer
over all others. If one plan and its group of providers offer higher quality services for a lower premium than the others, two things are likely
to happen. One, more subscribers will switch to it, and two, the other
plans and their providers will improve their quality and efficiency to
become more competitive. All of this occurs without government mandates. All of this occurs as each provider group chooses to respond to
Adam Smith's "invisible hand," which is what a free market is all
about.
Can high percentages of the doctors or hospitals in a community join
together to form their own alternative insurance plan? These arrangements violate the "small group" requirement for joint ventures and.
thus, are unlawful under the antitrust laws. By including a high percentage of all providers, competition between providers over efficiency
is substantially eliminated."" Under the rule of reason's balancing test,
too much competition is lost to outweigh any procompetitive benefits,
and the arrangement is thus illegal.
117. Insurers controlled ty small groups of providers compete in provider markets. At the
other extreme, the cartel joint venture with oo% of local providers does not compete in provider
markets, just as any successful cartel eliminates all competition among cartel members.
Applying these standards to the ien IPAs included in one study, all ten incltded from 42,%e10O'
of local physicians and thus all would probably be unlawful. Egdahl. The Poieniial o/Organ:a-
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H.

Medicaid Borcoizs
The single most common government antitrust case in the health
care field involves group boycotts of Medicaid or other government
programs." 8 Providers unhappy with low levels of government reimbursement join together to withhold their services until the government
raises its reimbursement levels.
They join together to increase their "clout" with the government.
Although the grievance may be perfectly valid, the means chosen generally is not. This type of provider joint action can represent precisely
the kind of conduct the antitrust laws are designed to prevent: joint
action by competitors to raise prices through a collective boycott. It
usually violates both requirements of the "small groups can be beautiful- rule. First, there is no legitimate joint venture when the sole purpose of the venture is to raise prices. Second. a large group of
providers is necessarily involved, because a small group usually does
not have any clout.
On the other hand, it is perfectly lawful for indi'idual providers to
refuse to participate in Medicaid or any other insurance program because the prices are too low.
I. Bo'coti.r of Alternative Providers
Imagine a city with excess hospital beds, and suddenly four new
providers appear: an HMO, an emergicenter, an ambulatory surgery
center. and a for-profit hospital. Can the established hospitals get to-ether for cost-containment purposes and agree not to offer the HMO
or the other new providers services or price discounts? Can they enter
agreements with insurers such as Blue Cross not to pay for services
rendered by the new providers?
Generally speaking, any of these actions by established hospitals
have serious antitrust risks."' None of these agreements are lawful
tionsof ,'efor S errce Ph's iciatnrfo .4chiesi'ng Signyftcant Decteasei in Hospitali:ation. 186 A%N U,.ol St'(,t RY 388. 390 table I (Sept. 1977).

One im portant issue for research is how to determine a means of measuring structural competittcn%%of provider markets. The traditional concentration measures of industrial organ.ation
economics arc not applicable given the pervasive absence of provider price competition. Two
important factors suggested by the preceding analysis are: first, the number of health care plans
(with limited groups of providers) and second, the percentage of the insured population with incentmae multiple choice. See. e.g.. Alnn. Coalition Update (Spring 1982) (only 20% of Minneapolis
emplo,,cr%made equal contributions for all health insurance options and paid less than 100% of
the tutal premium)
I IX For example. !.even of the twenty antitrust cases brought by state attorneys general as of
mid- 19M) invt)lvrd provider boycotts of state programs. Enforcement of Srale A.nlitnuf laws Gains
.tlomentun. O.io Sets Pace. FAII RI-v.. May-June 1981, at 23. 26.
119. Sec. e....
Ohio v. Mahoning County Medical Soc'y. 1982-1 TRADi. CAS. (CCII) 1 64.557
(N 1). Ohio 1982) (hospitals* consent decree): United States v. Halifax )losp. Medical Center.
1981-1 TR, 01. CAS. (CCIl) 1 64.151 (M.D. Fla. 1981) (consent decree).
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joint ventures under either test. The joint action is neither by a small
group nor is it a legitimate joint venture intended to improve competition. To the contrary, the collective action is designed to exclude the
new competitors from the market and will often be illegal per se as a
group boycott. It may well be that new suppliers of services are not
needed. However. under the antitrust laws, that is a decision to be
made by the market or government but not by private groups of competitors. The criminal indictment and conviction of the American
Medical Association for its actions against an HMO in Washington.
D.C.")1 poignantly demonstrate the antitrust risks of this type of joint
action.
J.

Coalitions

Coalitions are one of the fastest growing new phenomena in the
health care field. They range in composition from business-only
groups to organizations with representatives from industry, labor, hospitals. physicians, dentists, pharmacists. commercial insurers, HMOs.
and Blue Cross and Blue Shield' They are involved in a wide range of
activities. The broad range of coalition membership and activities
make it impossible to provide a complete antitrust analysis of coalitions
here. The issue of health planning alone. e.g., is the proper subject of a
separate article. 2'- It is possible, however, to discuss selected activities.
Can all local employers join together i a coalition and collectively
bargain with doctors or hospitals for lowe." prices? As indicated in example C. hospitals are generally protected by the antitrust laws from
collective bargaining by large groups of enployers, while small groups
of employers can conduct collective negotiations.
Can all local hospitals bargain collectively with all local employers.
in something akin to labor negotiations? As examples C and E concerning collective negotiations by purchasers and collective negotiations by hospitals suggest, there are serious antitrust risks with twosided collective negotiations as well. These risks are reflected in the
fact that collective bargaining by labor unions is specifically exempted
from the antitrust laws. Small groups of collective negotiations, however, can be lawful.
Can a coalition, however composed, lobby government at the federal, state, or local level for legislation affecting health care providers or
regarding a CON (certificate of need) for a specific hospital? Generally
speaking, as long as the coalition's activity is confined to lobbying, it is
immune from antitrust liability under the Noerr-Pennington doc120. American Medical Ass'n v. United States. 317 U.S. 519 (1943).
121. See. e.g.. Sims & Grimm. Hlealth Planning Activities Tet Shermar 4ci. 1llsp. 1-tN.
MoM'T.. July 1981. at 12.
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trine.' '-- However, as the Rex Hospital case pointedly demonstrates.
care must be taken to stay within that exemption.
Can coalitions collect and share information on local health care
costs and utilization and on methods of controlling health care costs!?
This type of activity can be structured and conducted in ways that are
perfectly liwful and procompetitive. The safest information-sharing
activity is when it is limited to facilitating individual action by individual businesses, individual providers, or other individual coalition members. Joint action by buyers or by providers can be perfectly lawful so
long as they carefully comply'
with the "'small groups can be beautiful"
-rule and the antitrust laws.

V.

CONCLUSIONS

The present structure of American health care insurance, replete
with its perverse incentives, was largely built over the last fifty years
upon the American Medical Association's now illegal contract practice
and "'free choice" ethics. Justice Stevens' cogent analysis in Maricopa
symbolizes a fundamental turning point in the history of American
health care. The era of guild ethics is over. In the new era of antitrust
in health care. large groups of providers can no longer join together to
take economic action. Small groups of competitors. however, under
standard antitrust law for joint ventures, can group together with new
ways of providing quality services efficiently in a private system of
health care delivery.

122 See. e.g.. id.
12 3. See. e.g.. U.S. Department of Justice Busines Rc sc%, letter to Maryland hlcalth (.are
Coalition (Feb. 22. 1982); U.S. Deparment of Justice Iusincs Review letter to Southwest Mlichi.
gan Ifealth Sytcms Agency. Inc. (March 3. 1982). See also C. LANMb & C. Si.I.us.
TRADI.
Asso(W
IATIO LAW A)
PRAC Tit 1 (rev. cd. 1971).
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